



BACKGROUND GUIDE

DISEC



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Letter from the Secretariat

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the 2026 edition of the Masaryk University Model United Nations Conference. As Secretary General, it is an immense privilege to witness the incredible passion and dedication each of you will bring to this conference.

As our motto suggests, our aim for this year is to help delegates lead, think, and be inspired. In accordance with this goal, we have curated a diverse selection of committees and topics that ensure heated debate and the need for compromise. We hope that each delegate can take advantage of the unique space that MUNs bring, one where ideas are tested, diplomacy is practiced, and perspectives are broadened.

On behalf of the entire MUNIMUN team, I wish you the best of luck in your preparations and sincerely hope you have fun at the end of the day.

Do not forget that we are here to help ensure that your experience at MUNIMUN is the best that it can be. Should you have any questions, comments, concerns, or any other statements, please do not hesitate to contact me, your chairs, or the general MUNIMUN email.

I look forward to seeing the energy you bring to this conference and the lasting memories you will create.

Best wishes,

Kerem Efe Özen

Secretary General



Letter from the chair

Dear Delegates,

I would like to express my sincere gratitude for participating in the Disarmament and International Security Committee. I am the chair of this Committee, and together with my colleague Rens, we will be presiding over the sessions of our Committee. I am in my final semester in the programme International Relations and European Politics, and I am from Myanmar, also known as Burma. I enjoy, of course, reading news on global politics and diplomacy, and reading legal documents such as legislations. Rens will be my co-chair. He is originally from the Netherlands and currently in his fourth semester in IREP. He enjoys keeping himself busy with various projects, for example, he and some of his colleagues are now starting a new student association called SSINC. Other than that, he enjoys reading and playing chess.

As we gather in this Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), we believe that in our very deep spirit we share a common interest in contributing to global disarmament and security affairs to prevent any sort of humanitarian catastrophe.

The two topics that we chose, among others, are very much well-known and invaluable agendas to earn experiences of diplomacy under the Model United Nations. Through our productive negotiations and exciting sessions that are yet to come and to which we together are genuinely looking forward, we strongly believe and wish that each individual delegate will utilise the utmost potential of his or her ability in pursuit of effective solutions to the issues at hand, and will develop further his or her understanding of diplomacy and personal skills.

Best regards,

Thi Ha Zaw

Rens Joran Schuurman

The Chairboard of DISEC



Committee overview

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), consisting of all 193 UN Member States, is mandated to deliberate on disarmament, arms control, and international security. It focuses on conventional weapons (e.g. small arms), nuclear disarmament, emerging military technologies such as those relating to cyberspace and autonomous systems, outer space security (PAROS), as well as global and regional threats. DISEC promotes international norms and confidence-building measures; non-binding resolutions influence treaties such as the NPT of 1968, as well as broader international arms control frameworks.

DISEC was created by the UN General Assembly under the UN Charter in 1945. Following the Second World War and the subsequent usage of nuclear weapons, the international community felt the need to establish an international platform where states would be able to engage in dialogue on issues concerning security and arms regulation. As one of the six main committees of the General Assembly, DISEC serves as a deliberative and recommendation-producing body. It meets annually at UN Headquarters in New York during the General Assembly session, which typically lasts from mid-October to November. The committee engages in general debate, thematic discussions, proposes draft resolutions, develops recommendations, and makes decisions based on simple majority voting. However, the committee does not possess the authority to enforce its decisions; instead, it submits its draft resolutions to the General Assembly Plenary.

Historically, DISEC played a central role in addressing nuclear arms competition during the Cold War and supported international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. In the post-Cold War period, its focus expanded to include the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, particularly during the 1990s. More recently, the committee has addressed emerging security challenges, including artificial intelligence in warfare, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), cybersecurity and cyberwarfare norms, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space through ongoing discussions on PAROS.

Key Terms and Definitions

- NPT:
 - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

- DPRK
 - Democratic People's Republic of Korea (informally, North Korea)

- ROK
 - Republic of Korea (informally, South Korea)

- WWII
 - The Second World War

- USSR
 - The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (informally, the Soviet Union)

- UN
 - United Nations

- UNSC
 - United Nations Security Council

- IAEA
 - International Atomic Energy Agency

- CTBT
 - Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

BACKGROUND GUIDE

DISEC



TOPIC A:
**SECURITY GUARANTEE ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA**



Security Guarantee on the Korean Peninsula

Background

Defining the issue

The Korean Peninsula is divided between two belligerent states. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south are divided by the Military Demarcation Line. This border between the two Koreas remains one of the world's most heavily guarded borders.

The Korean War of 1950-1953 was concluded by an armistice treaty, not by a peace treaty. Therefore, the Peninsula technically remains at war, from which point the core problems arise. Since the end of the war, the DPRK has been wary of an existential threat from the US and its allies, partly due to the continued presence of US troops on South Korean soil.

Furthermore, the DPRK has developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities under its bid to respond to perceived threats presented by the US and the Republic of Korea. Conversely, the international community sees DPRK's nuclear program as a violation of international law and an immediate threat to global non-proliferation efforts. Therefore, a critical question under this topic arises:

“Can credible security guarantees reduce tensions and facilitate denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, or does deterrence through military strength remain the dominant paradigm?”

Herein, security guarantees refer to formal or informal assurances provided by one or more states to protect another state from external threat, in particular, military aggression. These guarantees may include many forms, including mutual defense treaties, non-aggression commitments, deterrence by means of nuclear capabilities, military alliances, and diplomatic assurances backed by international organizations such as the United Nations. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, security guarantees are deeply characterized by nuclear capability, military deterrence, and unresolved hostilities between the DPRK and ROK. The question largely concerns multiple actors, of which the DPRK and the ROK are central, and revolves around the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, on their assessments of threats and assurance for their survival and strategic interests.

A nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula is not limited regionally in effects; however, it will present detrimental consequences across the world. East Asia is home to global major economic and military powers, including Japan, the ROK, China and Taiwan. As such, any escalation, whether intentional or not, can disrupt global markets, undermine international law, including Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and potentially drag other superpowers such as the United States and Russia into the conflict. As part of an international institution responsible to deter any such disruption to the global rule-based order, the DISEC must address this issue



prudently not only to strengthen international law and multilateral diplomacy but also to deliver precedents for dealing with the crises of likewise nature in the coming future.

Historical background

Japanese Rule in Korea

Korea was under the administration of the Japanese Empire from the early 20th century until it was liberated by the allied forces at the end of the Second World War. The rule originated with the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War which lasted from 8 February 1904 to 5 September 1905, simultaneously ending Russia's territorial ambition in East Asia through the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, although Japan officially annexed Korea (then Korean Empire) in 1910.

During the Japanese imperial reign over the Korean Peninsula, Korean language and culture were hugely marginalized. For example, Japan tried to eliminate the use of Korean language in schools and insisted on adopting Japanese as a means of communication. This was one of the motivations for Koreans along with other political and national grievances to revolt against Japanese rule. This was reflected in the very early liberation movement conducted by Koreans in 1919, noting Korea to be one of the colonies earliest to stand up against their foreign rulers.

In the lead up to the events of the Second World War in the East Asian theatre, the Korean liberation movement intensified with their involvement in the fight against the Japanese imperial army. This was concluded when Japan was defeated by the allied forces and surrendered in 1945 (Korean Cultural Center NY, 2022).

Division of Korea

Following the Japanese surrender, the Korean peninsula which was once under the Japanese rule was occupied by the allied forces. The southern part was occupied by forces led by the US while the northern part was occupied by the Soviet forces. The Cairo Declaration of 1943, before the conclusion of WWII, was issued by the US, Great Britain, and China, in which Korean independence was guaranteed in due course. Leading up to the Japanese surrender, in February 1945, US President Franklin Roosevelt came up with an idea to divide the Korean peninsula into the trusteeship under the US, Great Britain, the USSR, and China (Republic of). This was agreed by the USSR in principle, but was not implemented comprehensively due to tensions between Anglo-American allies and the USSR.

General Order No. 1, drafted on 11 August 1945 and approved by US President Harry S. Truman on the following 17 August 1945, was issued by Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces General Douglas MacArthur, to facilitate the Japanese surrender. It stated that Japanese forces stationed north of the 38th parallel surrendered to the USSR forces, while the forces south of the 38th parallel surrendered to the US forces. This has later become the primary division line between North and South Korea.

In 1947, as an effort to unify the two occupation zones on the Korean Peninsula, the US submitted to the United Nations General Assembly to call for general elections in Korea. A UN Temporary Commission to oversee the electoral process was then created. The USSR forces, which occupied the northern half, however, did not allow the Temporary Commission to enter northern Korea. Therefore, elections were held only in the south on 10 May 1948. Through the results of this election, the Republic of Korea was founded with Rhee Syngman as the first president (Korean Cultural Center NY, 2022).

On the other hand, constitutional drafting was underway in the North. In April 1948, after the Supreme People's Assembly adopted a new constitution, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was inaugurated in Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung became the supreme leader and the general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea after its establishment in 1949, and remains the ruling party of the DPRK to this day.

Korean War

The Korean War started when the DPRK forces (known as Korean People's Army or KPA) invaded the ROK on 25 June 1950. The KPA was heavily trained and supported technically by the USSR. At the very start of the war, the ROK defense forces were outweighed by their belligerence, which advantaged the latter to advance into the territories of the South in a short time.

As the invasion progressed, the United Nations intervened by supporting the ROK government. UN forces were led by the US and combined troops sent by multiple countries, including the UK, Australia, India, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces General MacArthur, a US army general, famously led the UN forces in combat against the KPA. He orchestrated the ambitious landing at the port of Incheon, which later significantly helped the southern troops to expel the KPA forces up to the Yalu River, dividing the border between the DPRK and the People's Republic of China. From that point, Chinese forces (People's Liberation Army, PLA) entered the Korean War from the DPRK side, and the UN forces were pushed southwards back (Imperial War Museums, 2018).

Peace negotiations had been going on during the events of the war from 1951. However, it was until 27 July 1953 on which day an armistice agreement between the two Koreas was finalized and signed by the delegations of the US, the PRC, the DPRK and the ROK. The signing took place at Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone dividing the DPRK and the ROK. The Armistice Agreement established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the DPRK and the ROK at Panmunjom.



Herein, it is to note that the Armistice Agreement between the DPRK and the ROK is not a peace treaty concluding any type of military engagement, instead is a ceasefire agreement.



Therefore, it is assumed the war is still going on until now, although only minor clashes have occurred from time to time since.

International framework

The DPRK has long embraced its ambition to possess nuclear weapons, and it is assumed now to be one of the countries that possess nuclear weapons. Under international law, the most important treaty to regulate nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a legally binding treaty in force since 1970. Currently, there are 191 parties to the treaty. It requires countries that possess nuclear weapons to pursue negotiations in good faith towards disarmament, and requires non-nuclear countries to refrain from developing such weapons. Article VI of the treaty states *“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”* (Art. VI, NPT).

The DPRK acceded to the treaty in 1985, but withdrew in 2003, making it the only country to withdraw from the treaty. In 2006 and 2009, it tested its nuclear weapons. This has raised international concern over future nuclear warfare as a result of the DPRK undermining the legitimacy and enforceability of the NPT.

The UN Security Council has issued multiple resolutions regarding DPRK’s nuclear practices. There are nine major resolutions condemning DPRK’s seek for nuclear weapons and imposing sanctions on the country.

UNSC Resolutions —

- (1) [S/RES/1718\(2006\)](#)
- (2) [S/RES/1874\(2009\)](#)
- (3) [S/RES/2087\(2013\)](#)
- (4) [S/RES/2094\(2013\)](#)
- (5) [S/RES/2270\(2016\)](#)
- (6) [S/RES/2321\(2016\)](#)
- (7) [S/RES/2371\(2017\)](#)
- (8) [S/RES/2375\(2017\)](#)
- (9) [S/RES/2397\(2017\)](#)

S/RES/1718(2006) — adopted after the event of DPRK’s first nuclear test. It imposed sanctions including an arms embargo, a ban on nuclear- and missile-related technology transfers, asset freezes, and travel bans on individuals linked to DPRK’s nuclear programme.

S/RES/1874(2009) — Expanded sanctions after another nuclear test. It strengthened the arms embargo, authorized inspection of suspicious cargo to and from the DPRK, and tightened financial restrictions.



S/RES/2087(2013) — Condemned DPRK's satellite launch using ballistic missile technology and expanded targeted sanctions on individuals and entities involved in its nuclear and missile programmes.

S/RES/2094(2013) — Adopted after DPRK's 3rd nuclear test. Further strengthened financial sanctions, expanded asset freezes and travel bans, and called for monitoring of DPRK's banking activities.

S/RES/2270(2016) — Introduced one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes, including restrictions on mineral exports (such as coal and iron), aviation fuel sales, and extended cargo inspections.

S/RES/2321(2016) — Further tightened economic sanctions including on DPRK's coal exports and expanded financial and diplomatic restrictions.

S/RES/2371(2017) — Increased economic pressure on DPRK by banning exports of coal, iron, lead, and seafood, which are major sources of revenue for the DPRK.

S/RES/2375 (2017) — Adopted after a nuclear test and imposed new restrictions on oil supplies, banned textile exports, and limited the number of overseas workers sent by the DPRK.

S/RES/2397(2017) — Imposed sanctions after the DPRK conducted a long-range missile test, including reducing refined petroleum imports, and required the repatriation of DPRK's overseas workers, and strengthened maritime inspection measures.

Current state of the issue

Despite having been economically damaged during the war, The Republic of Korea has undergone multiple series of economic reforms through an export-led growth strategy. This helped the country to become economically strong, outweighing its northern neighbor which exercises a closed communist economy.

The Republic of Korea has become one of the most advanced economies which earned it to develop and improve military capabilities. The presence of US forces until today also reaffirms the close ties between the US and the ROK on multiple grounds, including military strategy, cooperation in defense sectors and the development of defense technologies (US Congress, 2025). This has been the central concern for the DPRK, from which point motivated it to seek for nuclear capabilities for its own security guarantees while being under persistent international sanctions as a result of its human rights records.

The focus of the two countries are also different in the sense that the DPRK prioritises the survival of the ruling regime and prevention of foreign intervention. In this case, nuclear weapons act as a deterrence against such speculations. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea prioritises its national security, and is dependent on alliance relations with the United States. Unification is the objective of Seoul in its interaction with Pyongyang. For example, under former president Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), relations between Seoul and Pyongyang improved

significantly through the Sunshine Policy that seeks peaceful coexistence between the two and phased unification (Levin and Han, 2002). The policy was pursued throughout the first decade of the 21st century under President Kim Dae Jung and his successor Roh Moo Hyun. However, the policy was largely discredited as a failure by President Roh's successors Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye. President Moon Jae In, who succeeded President Park Geun Hye in 2017, however, resumed the sunshine policy which resulted in multiple inter-Korea summits.

Nevertheless, the DPRK's constant nuclear threats undermine all these efforts. This continues to direct the security on the Peninsula to a mutual miscalculation. In essence, a solution to reach security guarantees and disarmament which are two interrelated dimensions, hugely depends on the willingness of both states and who hold the political authority either in Seoul or Pyongyang.

Delegates should therefore consider these issues:

- (1) The enforcement of international sanctions and compliance thereof by the states on the DPRK;
- (2) The strengthening of the implementation of UNSC resolutions;
- (3) The security guarantees that recognises the sovereignty of the DPRK and its rightful existence for the purpose of dismantling nuclear warheads and entering into global non-proliferation regime;
- (4) The reduction and disarmament of highly destructive conventional weapons held by both states to protect regional stability and to prevent humanitarian crises.

Bloc Analysis

Bloc 1 (The Republic of Korea, The United States, Japan, and their allies)

The first major bloc includes the Republic of Korea, United States, Japan, and their several allies. These countries primarily focus and prioritize deterrence, denuclearization, and a maintenance of rule-based global order and security. These priorities are carried out by those countries through diplomatic and economic pressures. They generally advocate for complete and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK. Still, they maintain strong military deterrence to prevent potential aggression of the DPRK, for example, the presence of US troops on the ROK's soil that demonstrates their mutual defence cooperation but which makes Pyongyang feels threatened.

This bloc hugely utilises approaches that combine diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and military cooperation. They usually support the UN's sanctions on the DPRK. The primary aim of this group is to prevent nuclear proliferation in East Asia. They tend to protect their populations and critical infrastructure from missile threats from the DPRK.

Bloc 2 (The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, the Russian Federation, and their allies)

The second bloc contains the DPRK and its allies, namely Russia and China and some countries that hold a less confrontational strategy towards the DPRK. Unlike the first group, their priorities are regime security and sovereignty rather than denuclearisation through pressure. At

the centre of this group is the security guarantees for the DPRK, which is important to attain stability on the peninsula. They argue that military cooperation within the opposing bloc undermines the DPRK's sovereignty and statehood, prompting Pyongyang to view nuclear weapons as essential to its survival.

This group leans toward gradual negotiations rather than pressures and sanctions. In particular, China, which shares a boundary with the DPRK, sees the stability on the peninsula as a strategic interest. Russia, which is another neighbour of the DPRK, provides diplomatic and military support to restrict Western influence.

Bloc 3

Countries not in either of the blocs 1 and 2 are mostly those that claim to be neutral and non-aligned states. These countries generally focus on multilateral diplomacy and global non-proliferation regime. They include, for example, countries from Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They tend to support peaceful dialogues, the role of international institutions, humanitarian considerations, and the reduction of tensions



BACKGROUND GUIDE

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TOPIC B:
**NUCLEAR REGULATIONS AND
SECURITY GUARANTEES
BETWEEN IRAN
AND PAKISTAN**



Nuclear Regulations and Security Guarantees between Iran and Pakistan

Background

Defining the issue

The evolving strategic alignment and defence cooperation between Pakistan and Iran raise important concerns regarding the potential use or threat of nuclear weapons and their implications for regional and global security. These dynamics are particularly significant given that Pakistan possesses nuclear capabilities, while Iran continues to develop its nuclear programme, shaping broader perceptions of nuclear risk and deterrence.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan occupy important geopolitical locations in South and Southwest Asia. They share a long border, which sometimes experiences clashes and security concerns in Baluchistan, a region divided between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Apart from this, Iran and Pakistan generally enjoy stable relations with mutual interests in cross-border trade and energy supplies. Yet beyond these bilateral relations, there arises a consequential question of how evolving strategic cooperation between the two regional powers, one of them being an acknowledged nuclear-armed state and one nuclear-seeking state, transform regional and global security dynamics?

The issue at hand does not arise from a formal nuclear alliance committed between the two countries. In fact, no such treaty exists. But rather, it is about the strategic alignment and defence cooperation in a region of fragile relationships between each other. Iran's tensions with Israel and some Gulf states, Pakistan's rivalry with its neighbour India, and the involvement of external powers, the US and China, collectively characterize the security dynamic.

The central focus of this topic will be on bringing forward possible solutions to regulate concerns surrounding Iran's nuclear activities and how to manage or prevent potential destabilizing cooperation in sensitive nuclear or military technologies. In doing so, delegates may discuss mechanisms to encourage greater transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and examine how Pakistan can, by recognizing its strategic influence and responsibilities as a nuclear-armed state, contribute to a more peaceful and stable regional order. At the same time, delegates shall consider encouraging Pakistan to come under the NPT jurisdiction.

Supportively, it is under DISEC's mandate to promote regional and international peace and security, as well as to address how nuclear deterrence and alliance geopolitics intersect with global non-proliferation norms and broader international stability. Through these discussions, delegates should be able to develop solutions that help reduce nuclear risks, enhance transparency, extend the jurisdiction of the NPT and strengthen the international rule-based order.



Historical background

Pakistan, officially the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, is a country in South Asia bordering India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China. It is the fifth most populous country in the world with a population of over 240 million, and one of the world's largest muslim majority countries. Having been part of the former British India, Pakistan gained independence in 1947 following a separation with India. East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, was once part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, being divided between them by the landmass of India, until its independence in 1971. Throughout the decades, the two neighbouring countries of India and Pakistan have had a hostile relation towards each other. Both countries have developed and acquired nuclear weapons, which have significantly changed the security dynamics in the South Asian region. Neither of them has acceded nor been a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan also maintains a strong military due to its ongoing rivalry with India.

Iran has had a long ambition to possess nuclear capabilities. Despite its explanation regarding its nuclear plans to be of peaceful civilian-use focus, many, including the US, believe that it has been developing highly destructive nuclear capabilities. At the same time, Tehran is a signatory to the NPT, which means there have been periods of cooperation between the country and international monitoring institutions on its nuclear sites. However, due to its closed political system and restrictions on these monitoring institutions' ability to conduct inspections inside Iranian territory, it has faced multiple international sanctions coming from the US and its allies.

International framework

Under international law, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extends its jurisdiction over global nuclear regulation. The primary agency responsible for carrying out the inspection under this treaty is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The main effort of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons across the world, to enhance peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to extend global nuclear disarmament in general and in absolute terms (NPT, 1970). It entered into force on 5 March 1970. Currently, there are 191 state parties to the treaty, including recognized global nuclear powers such as the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China, and the French Republic, all of which are also the permanent members of the UNSC. Iran has been a signatory and ratified it in February 1970, a month before the treaty came into force (Arms Control Association 2023).

On the other hand, Pakistan has never been a signatory to the NPT due to its security concerns in any possible conflict with India. It currently possesses an estimated 170 nuclear warheads, which are not deployed on launchers but retained in storage facilities (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2011).

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is also another major treaty dealing with nuclear power controls. The treaty, though signed by 187 countries and ratified by 178 countries out of 196 entities, has not yet entered into force since the 44 countries listed in the Annex 2 of the treaty have not all ratified it. Iran and Pakistan are also listed in the Annex 2. Only Iran has signed the treaty on 24 September 1996 but has yet to ratify it, while Pakistan has neither signed nor ratified the treaty (CTBTO, n.d.).



UNSC Resolutions on Iran

The current list is the UN Security Council's resolutions regarding Iran's nuclear programme.

- (a) [S/RES/1696\(2006\)](#)
- (b) [S/RES/1737\(2006\)](#)
- (c) [S/RES/1747\(2007\)](#)
- (d) [S/RES/1803\(2008\)](#)
- (e) [S/RES/1835\(2008\)](#)
- (f) [S/RES/1929\(2010\)](#)
- (g) [S/RES/2231\(2015\)](#)

S/RES/1696(2006) — The first resolution addressing Iran's nuclear programme. It demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment and related activities and warned that sanctions would follow if Iran failed to comply.

S/RES/1737(2006) — Imposed the first set of UN sanctions on Iran for failing to suspend uranium enrichment as set out under S/RES/1696(2006). It banned the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related technology to Iran and froze assets of individuals and entities related to its nuclear programme.

S/RES/1747(2007) — Expanded sanctions by adding more individuals and organisations to the asset-freeze list and imposed an arms export ban on Iran. It also called on states to limit financial assistance and vigilance in dealing with Iran's banks.

S/RES/1803(2008) — Further expanded sanctions by including travel bans and asset freezes and urging states to inspect Iranian cargo suspected of containing prohibited items. It also increased financial monitoring of Iran's banks linked to proliferation activities.

S/RES/1835(2008) — Reaffirmed previous resolutions and demanded Iran comply with them, but did not impose new sanctions. Its main purpose was to reinforce international pressure and unity on the issue.

S/RES/1929(2010) — Significantly expanded sanctions, including a complete arms embargo, restrictions on ballistic-missile activities, stricter financial controls, and authorisation for states to inspect suspicious cargo to and from Iran.

S/RES/2231(2015) — Endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and replaced the previous sanctions regime. It provided for the lifting of many UN sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits and monitoring of its nuclear programme, while keeping some temporary restrictions and a mechanism to restore sanctions in case Iran violated the agreement.

Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

In accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 71/258, member states of the UN agreed to hold a conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding treaty banning nuclear weapons. The resolution aimed to advance the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons absolutely. All UN member states were encouraged to participate together with international organisations and civil society groups. The conference took place in New York in 2017, with two sessions. During these meetings, member states negotiated the TPNW. It establishes broad prohibitions against activities related to nuclear weapons. It bans the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The treaty also forbids deploying nuclear weapons on national territory or helping others in prohibited activities. States

that join the treaty must prevent such activities within their jurisdiction and support victims affected by nuclear weapons use or testing. The TPNW was adopted on 7 July 2017 and entered into force on 22 January 2021. The treaty is a legally binding UN agreement, and the first of its kind to include measures addressing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear use. Neither Iran nor Pakistan are currently signatories or parties to the treaty, which means that they are not bound by the treaty.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

JCPOA is an agreement between Iran and global powers, including five permanent members of the UNSC - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia, plus Germany and the European Union, in July 2015 concerning the Iranian nuclear programme. In the deal, Iran committed that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes and opened to more comprehensive international inspection, primarily conducted by the IAEA. Iran agreed to limit its uranium enrichment levels to 3.67 percent. In exchange, the US, UK, and the EU revoked economic sanctions imposed on Iran. However, the deal is currently defunct following the United States' withdrawal in 2018 under President Donald Trump, after which Iran, in response, revived its nuclear programme.

Current state of the issue

Possible Scenarios

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan generally enjoy a stable relationship. The security considerations between the two countries, however, involve periodic regional conflicts in bordering Baluchistan. Apart from this, the bilateral relations extend from diplomatic to several economic and regional cooperation.

Balochistan, which is a region spanning three different countries, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, has been an insurgent region to attain an autonomous status. Despite having warm relations, Iran and Pakistan have had periodic clashes regarding Balochistan. In 2024, the two countries exchanged a series of missile launches into each other's territory targeting Baluch insurgent groups. Iran first attacked the ISIS-related militant group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) in Pakistan's Balochistan province, and Pakistan conducted a retaliation two days later into Iran's Sistan-Baluchistan province against the Baluchistan Liberation Army and the Baluchistan Liberation Front. However, both countries restored their diplomatic relations shortly after the clashes. Given their strategic relations, it is unlikely that a bilateral war against each other will emerge any time soon (Chatham House 2024).

An important consideration here is that while an armed confrontation is unlikely, there is a possibility that the Baluchistan insurgency can create tensions that can lead to escalation risks due to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. This highlights the importance of a nuclear state in managing regional security. Any consequence that arises as a result of confrontation between a nuclear-armed state and a nuclear-seeking state will be a great detriment to regional and broader global security. Furthermore, the strategic presence of the Pakistani military establishment in the territory of Balochistan risks the security of sensitive sites and transportation routes falling into

the hands of non-state actors. For example, Pakistan has constructed a highly secured underground complex in the region that can be used as a ballistic missile and nuclear warhead storage site (Institute for Science and International Security 2024). The geopolitical proximity of Balochistan between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and the risk of sensitive nuclear technologies being acquired by non-state actors not only undermines the international non-proliferation regime but also severely threatens global security.

A more concerning scenario is the possible transfer of uranium enrichment technology between Iran and Pakistan. This will severely affect the global non-proliferation regime. There are also past experiences regarding this scenario. A.Q. Khan, who was believed to be the father of Pakistan's nuclear programme, allegedly involved in an extensive international network which secretly transferred nuclear technology, equipment and expertise to several countries. For example, centrifuge designs, equipment and their components, and technical knowledge essential in uranium enrichment programmes were delivered to countries including Iran, Libya, and the DPRK (Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.). Therefore, the delegates under the DISEC mandate shall consider ways to prevent such transfer of knowledge to countries with restricted international scrutiny. These ways shall be done in pursuit of maintaining the legitimacy and the supremacy of the NPT and other non-proliferation regimes under international law.



Image 2: Location Map of Balochistan

In essence, delegates shall consider these issues:

- (1) The prevention of nuclear technology transfer between Iran and Pakistan;

- (2) The implementation and strengthening of the enforcement of international sanctions on Iran and compliance thereof by the states to pressure Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities;
- (3) The implementation and strengthening of the enforcement of UNSC resolutions;
- (4) Encourage Iran to allow international monitoring bodies into its territory to conduct nuclear power programmes claimed for civilian use;
- (5) The prevention of any possibility that nuclear technologies may be acquired by non-state actors in the Balochistan region;
- (6) Encourage Iran to commit to the NPT and other non-proliferation regimes to which it is a party;
- (7) Encourage Pakistan to enter the global non-proliferation regime and to reduce its nuclear warheads to total abolition;
- (8) In order to achieve item (7), to consider what security guarantees should be given to Pakistan in light of its rivalry with India.

Bloc Analysis

Bloc 1 (Non-Proliferation Enforcement)

This bloc consists mainly of Western states, including the US, UK, France, Germany, and their allies, such as Japan. They emphasize the enforcement of global nuclear non-proliferation and international law governing nuclear weapons. The implementation of the NPT and the work of the IAEA are important to this group. They utilise imposition of sanctions, export-control regimes, and diplomatic pressures on countries like Iran to prevent them from obtaining nuclear capabilities. They are usually concerned about Iran's uranium enrichment programmes and potential risk of nuclear technology transfer or proliferation in unstable regions, in this case, the Iran-Pakistan border and Balochistan.

Bloc 2 (Sovereignty and Engagement through Diplomacy)

Countries in this bloc prioritise sovereignty and diplomatic dialogues rather than the imposition of sanctions and restrictions. They include China, Russia, Iran, and some non-aligned states. These countries usually accept the jurisdiction of international monitoring missions such as the IAEA to scrutinize Iran's nuclear facilities. However, they oppose harsh sanctions and coercive pressure, arguing that such actions against states undermine cooperation and national sovereignty. Their position is largely influenced by geopolitical interests, such as economic partnership with Iran.

Bloc 3 (Regional stability and Deterrence)

The third bloc includes Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and some countries that prioritize regional security and balance. They emphasize deterrence and stability due to their proximity to regional conflicts. They generally support diplomatic negotiations but remain concerned about how Iran's nuclear activities and regional instability will impact the balance of power in the region.

Research and Preparation questions

Topic A: Security Guarantees on the Korean Peninsula

1. What is the current official position of the country towards the nuclear weaponization of the DPRK?
2. What sort of problems and threats may arise as a result of failure to provide security guarantees on the Peninsula?
3. What sort of proposals should the country consider to preserve international rule-based order, i.e., all countries bound by international law to respect each other and to not provoke aggression against each other?
4. Is there any need for the DISEC in particular or the international community in general to provide an assurance for the existence of DPRK within an effort to encourage it to implement non-proliferation?
5. What in the capacity of the DISEC can we do to contain as much as possible the involvement of major powers to decrease the scope of any possible conflict or confrontation?
6. In a broader sense, how do we preserve and expand the compliance of countries with international non-proliferation frameworks, most importantly the NPT?

Topic B: Nuclear Regulations and Security Guarantees between Iran and Pakistan

1. What is the country's official stance and position towards nuclear weapons, especially Iran's nuclear programme?
2. What role should a nuclear-armed state play in promoting regional stability and preventing nuclear escalation in areas where nuclear and non-nuclear states interact?
3. How can the United Nations and the international community in general strengthen current nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms and norms to ensure transparency and accountability in states with advanced nuclear programmes, without undermining their sovereign rights to defence and peaceful nuclear energy?
4. Considering past concerns about unauthorised nuclear technology transfers Pakistan's historical expertise in uranium enrichment, how can the DISEC ensure that sensitive nuclear knowledge or dual-use technologies are not transferred between Iran and Pakistan, while still allowing scientific cooperation under the watch of the IAEA?
5. How can insurgency and instability in the Balochistan region affect the security of sensitive military infrastructure and nuclear-related facilities in Pakistan, and what measures can the international community take to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear materials and technologies and from exploiting regional security?
6. What kind of security guarantees should be established for precedence by the DISEC for both Iran and Pakistan to come under the jurisdiction of the global non-proliferation regime, particularly the NPT, and to encourage disarmament?



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